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The literature on political economy analyses of agricultural protection mainly focus on the impact of 
economic and demographic structures on the level of agricultural protection (Tyers/Anderson 1992, 
Swinnen 1994, Rausser et al. 1974), although it is commonly accepted that beyond economic and 
demographic structures political institutions do have an impact on the political power of different 
interest groups and hence on agricultural policy output (Gardner 1987 as well as Binswanger et al. 
1997). The impact of political institutions, e.g. the organization of legislature, election and party 
systems, on agricultural protection has hardly been taken into account explicitly in theoretical and 
empirical studies, yet. In this framework the paper investigates to what extent political institutions 
explain observed variances in the political power of the agrarian population in the ten Central and 
Eastern European Countries/Candidates (CEEC) applying for an accession of the EU. Moreover, it is 
analyzed to what extent EU-accession will be politically feasible given the specific political and 
economic framework conditions of the individual states. In particular, empirical analyses imply the 
following results: (i) the political power of the agrarian population varies significantly among the 
analyzed countries ranging from a relative low political weight of 0.115 of the agrarian population in 
Lativa up to an absolute political dominance of the agrarian population in Slovenia given a weight of 
0.887. (ii) The political weights are significantly determined by political institutions. In particular, the 
more the election systems corresponds to a proportional representation and the more the 
parliamentary organization allows for a specialized representation of agrarian interests, e.g. 
bicameralism where a second chamber representing regional interests, and the more efficient the 
organization of agrarian interests, e.g. existence of a peasent party, the higher is the political weight 
of the agrarian population. (iii) Analyzing to what extent EU-accession is politically feasible in the 
CEEC we can show that, assuming national financing of EU-policy, EU-accession would be hardly 
politically feasible in any CEEC-countries. An exception might be seen in Slovenia. Thus political 
feasibility of EU-accession crucially depends on keeping the principle of financial solidarity. Moreover, 
assuming a comprehensive pre-accession CAP-reform will take place, possible options to achieve 
political feasibility in the CEEC under these conditions would be undertaking constitutional reforms. In 
particular, the implementation of electorate system corresponding closer to a proportional 
representation or the establishment of bicameralism would be, at least theoretically, possible options. 
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Introduction 
It is a common observation that agriculture is generally subsidized in industrialized 
countries and mostly taxed in developing countries (Swinnen 1994, Tyers/Anderson 
1992, Miller 1991, Krueger/Schiff/Valdes 1988). From a welfare economic point of 
view both taxation and subsidization are inefficient, e.g. reduce total welfare of the 
general public. Solving the puzzle why inefficient agricultural polices persist in both 
developing and industrialized countries, respectively, political economy studies focus 
on specific characteristics of the political decision–making process (Peltzman 1976, 
Becker 1983, Krueger/Schiff/Valdes 1988, Gardner 1987, Swinnen 1994, 
Tyers/Anderson 1992, Miller, T. 1991, Zusman 1976). In particular, these studies 
understand agricultural policies as the results of political bargaining (competition) 
among various social groups for income/welfare r edistribution. The final policy 
outcome is determined by both the relative political bargaining power of agrarian and 
non-agrarian groups and the economically determined transformation of welfare 
among these groups. The higher the political bargaining power of a particular social 
group and the more favorable political welfare transformation towards this group the 
higher is c.p. the politically redistributed income towards this group in political 
economy equilibrium. Given these common features various political economy 
approaches explaining distorted agricultural policies differ in specific modeling 
strategies.  
On the one hand based on the fundamental contributions of Peltzman (1976) and 
Becker (1983) interest group models interpret the political decision-making process 
as a bargaining process among various interest groups representing the political 
interest of different social groups (See Gardner 1987, Miller, T. 1991, Rausser 
/Freebairn 1974). In political economy equilibrium subsidization and taxation of social 
groups, respectively, is mainly determinate by two components (1) groups’ cost of 
organization to overcome the free-rider problem inherent in collective political action 
and (2) the cost of income redistribution, i.e. deadweight costs.  
Interestingly, both empirical and theoretical studies focus mainly on economic and 
demographic factors influencing both cost of organization and deadweight costs. For 
example, following Becker (1983) Gardner highlights the importance of specific   3
characteristics of the economic system, e.g. price elasticities of supply and demand, 
determining deadweight cost of protection.  
Moreover, following the famous analysis of Olson (1965) cost of organization 
circumventing the free-rider problem inherent in political bargaining s ignificantly 
decrease with the size and homogeneity of the group. At a theoretical level Peltzman 
(1976) and Becker (1983) have given careful consideration to the numbers in an 
interest group, while Gardner (1987) and Olson (1986) analyzed empirically the 
impact of number of group members as well as other economic and demographic 
variables, i.e. the geographically dispersion of producers, importance of the 
commodity to each producers income or the stability of the industry, on cost of 
organization and hence on the agricultural protection level. Beyond Olson (1965) 
both groups of authors suggest a non-linear relation between bargaining power and 
group size. At least in democratic systems both the political weight of a social group 
as well as the free-rider problem increase c.p. with group size. Hence, there exist a 
threshold value corresponding with the optimal size of a social group. If groups are 
small, i.e. group size is below this threshold, political bargaining power increases with 
size and vice-versa if groups are large, i.e. their size is above of this threshold value, 
political bargaining declines with group size due to the free-rider problem.  
In contrast to interest group models voter support models interpret political decision-
making as an interaction among voters and politicians (Tyers/Anderson 1992, 
Swinnen 1994, de Grooter/Tsur 1991, Brock and Magee 1978). Rational politicians 
maximize their political support which is affected, provided by informed citizens, by 
policy-induced welfare changes. While existing voter support models analogously to 
the interest group models focus on economic structures determining deadweight 
costs, their main contribution can be seen in highlighting the fact that beyond the 
cost of organization relative income has a significant impact of on political bargaining 
power of social groups. Although Gardner (1987) has already discussed the 
hypothesis that “political appeal to demand of a social group for income 
redistribution will decline the higher reached level of redistribution”, interest group 
models do not emphasize relative income as a major determinant of the political 
economy equilibrium.    4
In particular, within their theoretical approaches Swinnen (1994) as well as Tyers 
and Anderson (1992) could derive a number of additional economic factors, e.g. 
share of agriculture in consumption and production, capital intensity of agricultural 
and industrial production, degree of self-sufficiency in food production, that 
determine groups’ political bargaining power and hence political economy equilibrium 
of agricultural policy. 
However, although the existing political economy models certainly do solve some of 
the puzzles observed in agricultural policy, these models do completely focus on 
economic and demographic factors and neglect p olitical factors, e.g. political 
institutions shaping the political decision-making process. On the other hand, it is 
commonly accepted that political institutions like electorate system and organization 
of legislature including formal decision making rules do have an significant impact on 
policy outcome (Miller, G. 1997, Weingast et. al. 1981, Binswanger/Deininger 1997). 
Moreover, international organization like The World Bank and IMF often bind their 
financial aid to the existence of specific democratic institutions, e.g. free election. 
Nevertheless, neither theoretically nor empirical analyses of the political economy of 
agricultural protection have taken explicitly into account political institutions as a 
determinant of agricultural policy outcome, yet. This is especially regrettable given 
the fact that in comparison to identified economic and demographic factors 
influencing political economy equilibrium, political institutions could be changed and 
adapted more easily by a society. While economic structures in general are the result 
of decentralized actions of many individual actors, i.e. can not easily be changed 
systematically, political institutions could systematically be changed by centralized 
constitutional choice procedures. Therefore, identifying i nefficient political 
institutions, that are political institutions implying inefficient agricultural policy 
outcomes in political economy equilibrium appears as a promising enterprise. 
Nevertheless one should not be too optimistic in this regard, since changing political 
institutions is again a collective constitutional choice problem. Hence, as we learned 
from positive political economy theory that political choice is not just a simple matter 
of knowing the right policies, we already learned from positive constitutional choice 
theory that constitutional choice is certainly also not a simple matter of just knowing 
the right institutions (see Buchanan 1991, North 1993, Voigt 2001). However, the   5
only way to attain better agricultural policies leads over establishing better political 
institutions. Thus, understanding the impact of political institutions is a necessary 
even if not sufficient condition/prerequisite for sustainable agricultural policy reforms 
in both industrialized and developing countries.  
In this framework the paper provides a first attempt to systematically analyze the 
impact of political institutions on agricultural policies at both theoretical and empirical 
levels.  Pars pro toto it investigates to what extent political institutions explain 
observed variances in the political power of the agrarian population in the ten Central 
and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) applying for an accession of the EU.  
Moreover, it is analyzed to what extent EU-accession will be politically feasible given 
the specific political and economic framework conditions of the individual CEEC. In 
detail, a simple general political economy equilibrium model is applied empirically to 
the ten CEEC. Theoretically, the model corresponds to a political exchange approach 
that generalized the political market approach of Tyers and Anderson taking multiple 
political actors into account that maximize their individual political support received 
by their specific clientle. On the basis of a simplified aggregated version of the 
political exchange model the impact of selected political institutions on the aggregate 
political power of the agrarian population is analyzed empirically. In particular, 
empirical analyses imply the following results: (i) the political power of the agrarian 
population varies significantly among the analyzed countries ranging from a relative 
low political weight of 0.115 of the agrarian population in Lativa up to an absolute 
political dominance of the agrarian population in Slovenia given a weight of 0.887. 
(ii) The political weights are significantly determined by political institutions. In 
particular, the more the electorate systems corresponds to a proportional 
representation and the more the legislative organization allows for a representation 
of particularistic agrarian interests, e.g. a federal system with a symmetric 
bicameralism with a second chamber representing regional interests, the higher is 
c.p. the political weight of the agrarian population.  
Forecasting the partial political economy equilibrium of EU-Accession implies that 
there exists a trade-off between political feasibility of EU-Accession within the CEEC 
and overall economic efficiency of the CAP in the enlarged EU. In particular, 
assuming constant economic structures for the non-agricultural sector in the CEEC,   6
EU-accession would only be politically feasible in these states if the common finance 
of the CAP according to the principle of financial solidarity will be sustain. Vice-versa, 
keeping this financial system of the CAP implies an increase of economic inefficiency 
of future CAP in an enlarged EU. Possible options to achieve political feasibility within 
the CEEC for a CAP-reform abolishing financial solidarity would be national 
constitutional reforms within the CEEC implementing a electoral system of 
proportional representation or establishing a federal system, i.e. a second chamber. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 the theoretical model is 
introduced and hypothesis regarding the impact of political institutions on political 
power are derived. Section 3 presents empirical analyses, while in section 4 a 
simulation analysis of the political feasibility of future EU agricultural polices is 
undertaken. Section 5 summarizes the main results and discusses main conclusions 
and implications for future research.  
 
1  The model 
Consider a political economy system comprising of an economic system ES and a 
political system PS. The economic system has two sectors: agriculture (A) and 
manufacturing (M). Each sector produces one good, XA and X M, respectively. Each 
sector uses one specific immobile factor K A and K M, respectively. K A captures 
agricultural capital and land, and KM captures industrial capital. Both immobile factors 
are assumed to be in a fixed supply. Moreover, both sectors use labor as a variable 
input. Let L A  and L M denote the amount of labor used in agriculture and 
manufacturing, respectively. Labor is considered as perfectly mobile where the total 
supply of labor L is also assumed to be fixed. Further, PA and PM denote the domestic 
prices of the agricultural and manufacturing good, respectively and PL denotes the 
domestic wage rate. We assume that both goods are tradable, where PA
w and PM
w 
denote the corresponding world market prices of the agricultural and manufacturing 
good, respectively. Labor is considered as non-tradable. Production technologies of 
the agricultural and manufacturing production can be represented by a restricted 
profit function:  
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Society G can be subdivided into agrarian (GA) and non-agrarian (GM) population. 
Agrarian population owns the quasi-fix production factors of the agriculture KA, while 
the non-agrarian population owns the quasi-fix production factor K M. Further, 





respectively. Hence, assuming a small country in economic equilibrium without any 
policy interventions good prices equal their corresponding world market prices and 
domestic labor wage P L is determined by market clearance on the domestic labor 
market: 
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Assuming no state activity implies that no taxes are collected, hence gross income 
equals net income. Furthermore, we assume for simplicity that all members of the 
agrarian population are identical as well as all members of the non agrarian 
population. The preferences of an agrarian and non-agrarian citizen can be 
represented by an indirect utility function v i (i=A,M). Net income of agrarian and 
non-agrarian population (Y
r
i) is allocated for consumption of agricultural and 
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Next we introduce agricultural policy. In particular, we consider two different policy 
instruments to support agrarian population, price policy (a) and transfers to quasi-fix 
factors ( b). Price policy is modeled in terms of nominal protection rate, while 
transfers to quasi-fix rents are modeled as fix payments per quasi-fix factor unit.   8
Obviously, both policy intervention shift economic equilibrium in the well-known way, 
e.g. price policy implies higher domestic prices for agricultural goods and therefore 
higher profits (rents) going to quasi-fix agricultural factors. Moreover, higher 
domestic agricultural output prices imply a higher domestic wage rates PL. Overall, 
nominal income of agrarian population is increased, since both profits and labor 
income is increased via agricultural price policy. Contrary, nominal gross income of 
non-agrarian population is overall decreased, as long as agrarian population is a net-
supplier of labor to the manufacturing sector. Additionally, agricultural policy implies 
net budgetary expenditures B(a,b): 
(6)  b + - a = b a A
w
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It is assumed that net-expenditures are financed via taxes, where tA, tM denote the 
tax share of the agrarian  and non-agrarian population, respectively. Obviously, it 
holds tA+tM=1 and ti ‡ 0 , i=A,M. Therefore, including agricultural policy net income 
no more equals gross income in equilibrium. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to 
calculate the economic equilibrium for exogenously given agricultural polices a and 





M,  a, b) can be defined corresponding to the net income redistribution 
between the agrarian and non-agrarian p opulation that can be reached applying 
agricultural price and transfer policies a and b. Obviously, T is crucially determined 
by specific characteristics of the economic system ES (see Gardner 1987, Swinnen 
1994, Becker 1983, Tyers/Anderson 1992). 
So far w e have taken agricultural policy as exogenous variables. To explain 
agricultural policies endogenously, political economy approaches take explicitly the 
political decision making process within the political system PS into account. Of 
course, analogously t o the modeling of the economic system, agricultural policy 
decision should be modeled as an equilibrium within the political system. To this end, 
the political economy models mentioned above assume a rather simple political 
system comprising of only one unitary political actor. Although the various political 
economy models differ in their detailed modeling strategy they all correspond to the 
following reduced from approach:   9
(7) 
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Wi (i=A,M) denotes the welfare of the agrarian and non-agrarian population, where 
in voter support models W generally corresponds to the net real income, interest 
group approaches normally take producer and consumer welfare as relevant welfare 
measures (see Gardner 1987, Swinnen 1994). S(w) corresponds to a political support 
function or pressure function reflecting the reaction of the political system induced by 
the realization of social group welfare w. Obviously, the specific properties of S 
correspond to specific characteristics of the political system.  
Now, to analyze explicitly the impact of political institutions on political economy 
equilibrium we assume in contrast to former approaches that the political system 
comprises of n political agents g=1,…,n. Each individual agent tries to maximize her 
political support. Analogously to the voter support models political support, provided 
by citizen considered as individual voters, is affected by policy-induced welfare 
changes. In particular, we assume that each individual agent has her specific 
constituency by which she is elected. Accordingly, we assume that political support of 





M). Analogously to Swinnen and Tyers/Anderson we assume that S g is 
monotonic increasing and concave in redistributed income, that is the higher the 
level of redistributed income the lower is c.p. the marginal political support derived 
from further redistribution. Under this assumption preferred agricultural policy 
positions of individual politicians,  ag  and  bg respectively, result from individual 
political support maximization:  
(8) 
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The individually preferred policy positions [ag,bg] of the individual political agents are 
aggregated to the final agricultural policy outcome  a*,b* according to the 
constitutionally determined legislative decision making-process. Modeling this process 
is a complex undertaking. In this regard we apply a political exchange model 
suggested by Henning (2000, see also Pappi and Henning 1998). The political 
exchange model combines and generalizes political exchange models originally   10
suggested by James Coleman (1966) assuming a market like organization of political 
exchange and a political exchange model of Weingast/Marshall (1988) assuming a 
non-market organization of political exchange. Since the modeling of legislative 
decision-making is not the main focus of the available paper, we will only briefly 
outline the main assumption of the model. For a detailed derivation of the political 
exchange approach see Henning (2000 or 2002).   
Generally, we assume that legislature comprising of the n legislators g=1,…,n is 
organized as follows. There exists a committee system of m committees Co1,..Com, 
where the committee system is a partition of the set of legislatures {1,..,n}, i.e. each 
legislator is a member of exactly one committee. Moreover, each committee has 
jurisdiction over a specific policy domain. A policy domain comprises of all policies 
regulating a specific area of the society. In particular agriculture is one of the policy 
domains and is regulated by the agricultural committee CoA. Within the agricultural 
policy domain agricultural policies  a*,b* are derived from the individual political 
preferences of its members according to the following mean voter decision rule (for 
detailed derivation of the mean voter decision rule see Henning 2000): 
(9) 


























Cgj denotes the political control or weight of the ideal position of an individual 
political agent g regarding the agricultural policy j. The actual political control is 
determined in the political exchange equilibrium. According to the approach of 
Henning (2000, 2002) political exchange equilibrium is derived in two steps. At a first 
step, following the non-market organization of political exchange suggested by 
Weingast and Marshall, legislators bed for “seats on committees associated with 
rights to policy areas valuable for their reelection” (Weingast/Marshall 1988). At a 
second step the final policy choice within a committee is derived via centralized 
political exchange of control resources over different policy dimensions of the policy 
domain controlled by a committee. Both bidding for seats on a committee and 
exchanging control rights over policy dimensions within a committee are determined   11
by legislators interest in reelection. In particular, note that the support maximization 
problem in eq.(8) can be approximated by a spatial policy preference Ug(dg(a),dg(b)), 
where dg(a) and dg(b) denote the Euclidian distance of the final policy choice a* and 
b* to the corresponding ideal point ag and bg of the agent, respectively.  
However, for simplicity we assume in the context of this paper that agricultural policy 
is one-dimensional. For example, assume that the agricultural policy mix is fixed to a 
specific relation of price and transfer policy (a0,b0) and politicians can only vary the 
intensity l, i.e. their preferred policy corresponds to l(a0,b0). In this case, the final 
policy choice corresponds directly to the mean voter position defined in eq. (9). The 
individual weights of the agricultural committee members are determined by the 
constitutionally fixed legislative decision-rule. In particular, it can be shown that the 
weights Cij just correspond to the probability that the ideal position of a committee 
member will be the outcome of an anticipated non-cooperative legislative bargaining 
process of a Baron/Ferejohn type (Baron/Ferejohn 1989, a detailed proof is given by 
Henning 2002). Moreover, the individual weights correspond to apriori voting power 
indices that can be calculated empirically for given political constitutions (Henning 
2002).  
Now, legislature organization corresponds to both the committee system, in 
particular which legislators are members of the agricultural committee, and the 
institutionally determined legislative decision-making rule under which agricultural 
policy choices are made.  
Obviously, legislators’ policy preferences vary systematically with the demographic 
structure of the constituency in which she is reelected. Thus, legislators being 
reelected in rural district have c.p. higher preferences for agricultural protection than 
legislators being reelected in an urban district. Therefore, comparing a centralized 
legislature including an unicameral parliament with a federal legislature including a 
bicameral parliament with second chamber that is regionally elected implies c.p. a 
higher share of legislators having political preferences for agricultural protection. 
Moreover, taking into account that the bidding mechanism is guided by legislators 
policy preferences, it follows quite plainly that assuming political exchange in a 
federal system the share of legislators preferring agricultural protection is even 
higher for the agricultural committee compared to the share in total legislature.   12
Hence, according to the mean voter decision rule, final agricultural policy is more 
biased towards welfare of agrarian population in a two when compared to a one 
chamber legislature. The latter holds especially true taking the fact into account that 
seat distribution in the second regional chamber is often biased in favor of rural 
districts (Lijphart 1999 : 207). Note that in comparative politics it is a well-known 
theoretical result that federal systems c.p. allow for a stronger representation of 
(rural) minorities (Lijphart 1999: 186).  
By the same argumentation it follows that a strong bicameralism, e.g. a system with 
formally equal legislative decision making power of both chambers, corresponds c.p. 
to a more biased agricultural policy when compared to a weak bicameralism, i.e. the 
second chamber is subordinated to the first (see Lijphart 1999: 205). For example, 
Lijphart distinguish six different types of bicameralism on the basis of the relative 
political strength of the second chamber (Lijphart 1999: 212).  
One final comment should be made. We do not argue that a change of the 
organization of legislature or of the electorate system will turn agricultural protection 
into agricultural taxation or vice versa. There is an overwhelming empirical evidence 
that taxation or subsidization of agriculture is mainly determined by economic 
factors, such as share of agrarian population and elasticities of consumption and 
supply, determining the marginal rate of income transfer between agrarian and non-
agrarian population. We only argue that beyond these basic demographic and 
economic determinants the specific political institutions do explain the variation in the 
degree of protection and taxation within different industrialized and developing 
countries, respectively. Note further, that bicameralism generally increases the 
political weight of rural population, thus, it would imply more efficient agricultural 
policies in developing countries, but less efficient in industrialized countries.  
Beside the organization of legislature we further want to highlight the impact of the 
electorate system on agricultural protection. In particular, we claim that the more  
the electorate system equals a majoritarian system the more national agricultural 
policy reflects c.p. the preferences of the majority of voters and vice versa the more 
a electorate system equals a system of proportional representation the more it is 
biased towards particular interest of organized minorities.    13
Theoretically, scholars of comparative politics define an electorate system mainly via 
the following three variables (1) electorate formula, i.e. the mechanism by which cast 
votes are transformed into parliamentary seats, (2) the district magnitude, i.e. the 
number of candidates to be elected in a voting district and (3) the electorate 
threshold, i.e. the minimum of votes a party has to receive to be represented in the 
parliament.  
Without going too much into detail based on this three variables electorate systems 
can be subdivided into different types ranging from a pure majoritarian system to a 
system of pure proportional representation (see Lijphart 1999: 143pp). It is 
commonly accepted in political theory that majoritarian systems tend to a higher 
electorate disproportionality, that is minorities are underrepresented in the 
parliament, when compared to proportional representation. Hence, according to our 
exposition above, in industrialized countries agricultural policy will be the more 
biased in favor of agrarian population the more the electorate systems corresponds 
to a proportional representation.  
To show how electorate systems have an systematic impact on agricultural policy 
consider the following simple election model. Assume there are n identical voting 
districts with a share of 45% of the agrarian population. Then applying a majority 
formula in one-member districts results in a parliament comprising only of urban 
representatives. In contrast, applying a system of list proportional representation 
results in a distribution of parliamentary seats with a share of 45% for legislators 
representing agrarian interests.  
Moreover, following political theory (Cox 1997 see also Lijphart 1999) the 
establishment of a peasant party specialized on the representation of particularistic 
interests of the agrarian population is also more probable under a representative 
when compared with a majoritarian electorate system.  Although the 
existence/establishment of small parties serving particularistic interests is not solely 
determined by the electorate system (see Lijphart 1999). However, beyond a 
representative electorate system the existence of a peasant party will c.p. shift 
agricultural policy equilibrium even more in favor of agrarian population. This follows 
since the existence of a peasant party, as a formal organization, significantly reduces 
cost of organization of the agrarian population (see Gardner 1987).   14
 
2  Empirical evidence from East European countries 
To test our theoretically derived hypotheses regarding the impact of political 
institutions on the political power of the agrarian population we apply the simple 
political economy model to the ten Central and Eastern European Candidate states 
(CEEC in the following) applying for accession to the EU
1. In detail we proceed as 
follows. 
First, since the estimation of the disaggregated model requires a lot of empirical data 
which were not available at this stage, e.g. data on individually preferred political 
positions of relevant politicians, we approximate political economy equilibrium by the 
reduced from approach in eq. (8). Assuming an aggregate support function of a 
Cobb-Douglas form we were able to estimate the political weight of the agrarian 
population for each CEEC-country based on available economic data and observed 
national levels of agricultural protection. Given the estimates of the national political 
weights d, we analyze the impact of political institutions empirically applying simple 
regression analyses.  
 
Estimation of national political weights (d ) 
Generally, political weights ( d) can be estimated on the basis of the first order 
condition of the maximization problem (8) given empirically observed agricultural 
policies and a specified economic system. In political economy equilibrium it holds 
that the marginal rate of political support substitution derived from the political 
support function S just equals the marginal rate of transformation derived from the 











Assuming the following Cobb-Douglas form: 
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1 In detail the countries we considered are Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Czech 
















Further, the marginal rate of transformation can be derived locally from the 






























































































l (j=A,M) just corresponds to a policy induced percental change of the real 
net income of the non-agrarian and agrarian population assuming a 1% change of 
the policy intensity l. It is a well known result that the different E
j
l can be derived 
from a linearized form of the original economic model (see for example DeJanvry et. 
al. 1991). A main advantage of using the linearized form is that it can be easily 
calibrated on the basis of general statistical data from the national e conomic 
accounting
2 and an estimation of relevant aggregated price and income elasticities, 
                                                 
2 In detail the share of agriculture in GDP, foreign trade, working population as well as the share of 
agrarian (rural) population is needed. Additionally, the share of agricultural good in consumption is 
needed. To calibrate given estimation of price elasticities to a consistent system of price elasticities we 
needed as well the profit shares. For the different countries data of national and sector accounting 
were basically taken for a specific year (1997 - 1999) published by European Union. Partly data was 
completed using specific country reports from the world bank, FAO or OECD. Following DeJanvry et al. 
(1991) elasticities were taken from available econometric estimation and than calibrated to a 
consistent system. National protection levels were measured by PSE-measures (see OECD for 
definition), that also have been published by the EU. Generally, estimating national political weights 
we assumed that agricultural policy correspond to trade policy interventions. Given the actual national 
agricultural policy applied in the CEEC this assumption appears realistic, although some countries 
already apply direct payment schemes.   16
while a full specification of the corresponding profit and indirect utility function is not 
necessary. 
Analyzing impact of political institutions  
Given the estimated national political weights d, the next step is to analyze to what 
extent observed variances in national political power can be explained by observed 
variance in the institutional design of the political system accordingly to the 
theoretically derived hypotheses above.  
To test our hypothesis we construct political variables corresponding to (a) the 
organization of legislature, (b) the electorate system and (c) to the cost of 
organization of the agrarian interest group 
 
a.  Organization of legislature (O) 
Bicameralism (O1): to measure bicameralism we define a dummy variable taking 
the vaule O1= 0 for unicameral and the value of O1=1 for bicameral systems, 
respectively;  
Presidency (O2): Further, we introduce a dummy variable measuring if national 
political system have a president. Since none of the analyzed political system 
corresponds to a presidential system of the US-type or a semi-presidential system of 
the French-type, we do not expect a significant impact of this variable. However, 
according to Cox (1997) the existence of a (strong) president implies that the party 
system is more focus, i.e. a president might have a least some impact similar to the 
impact of a majoritarian electorate system.  
 
b.  Electorate System (E):  
Typology of election system (E1): An index measuring the degree a national 
election system corresponds to a majoritarian and a representative system, 
respectively. The index ranges from 0 to 1, where E1=0 indicates a pure majoritarian 
and E1=1 a pure  representative systems. In detail, the index based on empirical 
work undertaken by Nohlen et. al. (1996,2000). Nohlen developed a typology of 
electorate systems based on the electoral formula including ten ideal types and   17
subdivided the electorate systems of Middle and East European countries into this 
typology. Basically, we used the typology of Nohlen. Since, according to the 
theoretical exposition above beyond the electorate formula electorate system is also 
defined by the magnitude of the district and the electorate threshold. Therefore, 
contrary to Nohlen we take explicitly the average magnitude of the districts 
(E2) and the electorate threshold (E3) into account. 
 
c.  Cost of organization of agrarian interest group (I): 
Share of rural population (I1):  Analogously to the theoretical and empirical 
interest group studies mentioned above we take the share of rural population as a 
proxy for the free-rider problem inherent in political action of the agrarian 
population.  
Existing parties representing agrarian interests (I2): Obviously, the size of a 
social group is only a indicator approximating the free-rider problem and the implied 
cost of organization. However, the actual political bargaining power of a group is 
mainly determined by the existing formal organization of groups’ interest. Hence, 
even if a group is relatively large, and even if this in fact implies high free-rider 
problems and costs of organization, it still might be the case for specific reasons that 
this group still or even despite of high cost of organization manages to organize its 
political action. In this case, the size is of course a misleading indicator. Therefore, it 
is always necessary to control existing formal interest group organizations, i.e. formal 
interest groups or political party specialized to represent particularistic interests of a 
social group. Although we had no information on interest groups , we were at least 
able to identify peasant parties in the investigated CEEC countries. Hence, the index 
I(2) generally measures if a peasant party exists in the parliament. Where I2=1 
indicates the existence of a peasant party and I2=0 the non-existence of such party. 
Since former socialistic parties do generally not represent interest of private farm 
families, we generally coded I2=0, if only a communist peasant party exists. 
 
 
   18
Results 
Economic structure and marginal rate of income transformation in the CEEC 
Empirical economic data used to calibrate the economic system is summarized in 
table 1 in the appendix. As can be seen from table 1 economic structure varies 
significantly a mong the CEEC. First, economic importance of agricultural sector 
measured in share of agriculture in GDP is high for Bulgaria, Romania and Lithuania 
with a share ranging from 10% for Lithuania up to 15% for Bulgaria. A slightly 
different picture appears measuring the importance of the agricultural sector in terms 
of share of rural population. Here, we observe relative high importance for all CEEC 
countries when compared to EU-countries given share ranging from 25% up to 48%. 
Analogously, the level of economic development varies also significantly among the 
CEEC with a per capita income ranging from 881 ECU for Bulgaria up to 7523 ECU for 
Slovenia.  
Accordingly, given the high variation of economic structures the marginal rate of 
transformation E defined above varies also significantly among analyzed CEEC-
countries. As can be seen in table 1 below, relative income redistribution via 
agricultural price and transfer policy is extremely costly in Slovenia, Hungary, Czech 
Republic where non-agrarian population has to give up between 1.8 – 2.6% of their 
welfare to imply a 1% increase of the agrarian income. Contrary, relative income 
redistribution is relatively cheap in the Baltic states as well as in Romania. In the 
Baltic states non-agrarian population has only to give up 0.2 p.a. of their welfare to 
generate a 1% welfare increase of the agrarian population, in Romania this relation 
is slightly higher with 0.6 p.a. A direct transfer of relative income changes can be 
observed for Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia, i.e. a 1% increase of the relative income 
of the agrarian population implies roughly a 1 p.a. decrease of relative income of the 
non-agrarian population. Analogously to the exposition of Tyers and Anderson as 
well as Gardner observed characteristics of transformation surface are mainly 
determined by share of agrarian working population and elasticities of supply and 
demand. Hence, the higher the share of agrarian working population and the more 
elastic supply and demand, the more costly is c.p. redistribution of income towards 
agrarian population via agricultural protection. Note that Slovenia is by far the riches 
CEEC-country for which the most elastic supply and demand responses can be   19
observed. Moreover, Slovenia has with a value of 48% the highest share of agrarianl 
population. Therefore, in Slovakia not only deadweight cost are high, but additionally 
the relative marginal political support is low according to eq. (11,12) above.  
However, comparing empirically observed agricultural policy, economically  
determined marginal rate of transformation seems to have only little impact on 
agricultural protection level. For example according to PSE-measures, Slovenia 
observing the less favorable transformation surface has by far the highest 
agricultural protection level, that is with a PSE of 42% comparable with the EU-level. 
On the other hand CEEC with economic structures that are relative favorable for 
agricultural income redistribution, e.g. Latvia, Estonia and also Romania, have an 
extremely low level of agricultural protection with a PSE below 10 p.a. is observed.  
Hence, obviously observed agricultural protection level can hardly been explained by 
economic factors alone, but political factors determining the relative political 
bargaining power of agrarian groups have to be taken into account.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that according to eq. (14) calculated relative political 
weights of the agrarian population vary significantly over CEEC. As can be seen from 
table 1 the highest political weights result for Slovenia with 0.887 followed by 
Hungary and Poland with a weight of 0.748 and 0.690, respectively. Relatively high 
political weights around 0.650 are received as well for Slovakia and Czech Republic, 
while the Baltic states and Bulgaria observe low political w eights below 0.2. For 
Romania also a relatively low political weight of 0.349 was calculated compared to a 
share of the rural population of 43%.  
Overall, empirical analyses imply the following results: Although all CEEC states 
preparing their EU-membership commonly adapted to a large extent the agricultural 
policy system of the EU, agricultural protection level vary significantly over CEEC 
states. These variances can not be explained by economic factors alone, accordingly 
a significant variance in the calculated relative political bargaining power of agrarian 
population is observed. Moreover, empirically observed relation between agricultural 
protection level, calculated political bargaining power and economically determined 
income transformation is rather complex. This fact implies that national agricultural 
protection levels are the result of an interplay of political and economic factors and 
cannot sufficiently explain by focusing on economic factors alone.    20
Next we want to analyze to what extent political institutions can explain the 
empirically observed variance in political bargaining power of agrarian population. To 
this end we undertake simple linear regression analyses taking the national weights d 
as endogenous variable and the different political v ariables defined above as 
exogenous variables.  
Main results are reported in table 2 below. Overall, regression analysis support our 
theoretically derived hypothesis. In particular, both bicameralism and a proportional 
representation scheme increase significantly the political bargaining power of 
agrarian population. The existence of a president has no significant impact on the 
political bargaining power. This is conceivable given the exposition above, since the 
president has in none of the analyzed CEEC significant legislative power. Beyond the 
electorate system index E1 neither the average magnitude of districts (E2) nor the 
electorate threshold (E3) have a significant impact on the political power. Moreover, 
for both variables the estimated signs do not c orrespond to the theoretically 
expected signs. Excluding the electorate system index resulted at least in the right 
estimated sign for the magnitude of districts, but the electorate threshold and 
magnitude of districts still remain statistically insignificant. Overall, the estimation 
results regarding indicator variables of the electorate system nicely corresponds with 
our theory.  
In contrast to former studies (see Gardner 1987) no significant influence of the share 
of rural population or share of agriculture in total GDP on political bargaining power 
was found (see table 2). Since rural population is significantly correlated with the 
number of chambers of the parliament, it turned to be statistically significant at least 
at the 10%-level, when we drop out the latter variable O1. But, including O1 results 
in a much better fit of the estimation measured in terms of adjusted R
2. Moreover, 
O1 is highly significant at the 5% level.  
Furthermore, econometric analyses imply some influence of the existence of a 
peasant party. Excluding non-significant variables stepwise leads to a final model 
including the number of chambers, the electorate system index and the peasant 
party dummy (I2). In this model peasant party dummy is statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level.    21
In quantitative terms the electorate system seems to have the highest impact on the 
political bargaining power of the agrarian populations followed by the legislative 
organization, while the organization of agrarian interest seems to have the lowest 
impact on political power. In detail, moving from unicameralism to bicameralism 
implies in average an increase in the political bargaining power of 50%, where 
introducing a peasant party increases average political power by 39%. Moving the 
electorate  system in the most majoritarian system observed for the ten CEEC- 
countries to the system with the highest proportional representation implies an 
increase of average political power of agrarian population by 90%.  
 
3  Implications for political feasibility of EU-accession of CEEC-
countries and economic efficiency of CAP 
According to standard trade theory EU-accession of the ten CEEC countries can be 
understood as a positive sum game, e.g. all states will realize a net gain of total 
social welfare.  
However, the distribution of welfare among different states as well as within states 
among different social groups might vary significantly and specific national social 
groups might even realize an overall welfare loss. Thus, from a political economy 
perspective beyond trade theory distribution of welfare is crucial for political 
feasibility of accession. In this regard it is a common point of view that CEEC states 
explicitly realize social welfare gains in agriculture, while the EU will realize a net gain 
in manufacturing. The explanation is twofold. First, CEEC do have comparative 
advantages in agriculture when compared with EU-15 and second the specific 
organization of the CAP implies additionally net-social welfare transfers from EU-15 
to CEEC. The last point follows directly from the specific principle of “financial 
solidarity” and the fact that the comparatively low per capita income of the CEEC 
states implies an extremely low budget share. Hence, in essence under the EU-
regime CEEC states will only have to finance a small part of the budgetary 
expenditures induced by their realized national agricultural protection levels when 
compared to a pure national finance of agricultural protection (see Koester 1976 and 
1996).    22
On the other hand, the principle of financial solidarity has been heavily criticized as a 
inefficient political institution inducing systematically higher agricultural protection 
levels, blowing up budget expenditures and fostering economic inefficiency of CAP 
(Koester 1976, 1996 and Henning 2002). Therefore, recent discussions on CAP-
reform suggest to abolish the principle of financial solidarity and re-nationalize the 
financing CAP-expenditures. The more future CAP-reform will abolish common 
finance of CAP-expenditure the lower are c.p. social welfare transfers from EU-15 to 
CEEC states. Hence, the less attractive appears EU-accession to CEEC. On the other 
hand it is straightforward to show that re-nationalization implies a political economy 
equilibrium corresponding with lower EU agricultural protection levels and therefore a 
higher economic efficiency of the CAP (Henning et. al. 2001).   
Thus, there is a trade-off between overall economic efficiency of the CAP, i.e. total 
sum of economic welfare realized in the enlarged EU, and the political feasibility 
corresponding to the specific welfare distribution among EU und CEEC states as well 
as among social groups within CEEC, respectively. 
Given our model above we can analyze to what extent EU-accession is politically 
feasible from a national perspective of the CEEC. In essence, forecasting the partial 
political economy equilibrium of EU-Accession implies two changes
3: (1) level of 
agricultural protection increases from actual national level to the EU-level and (2) 
according to the financial principles of the CAP-regime national budget share change 
from tn = 1 (pure national finance) to a lower share tn < 1.  
To analyze to what extent EU-accession is politically feasible in the CEEC we proceed 
as follows. (1) We assume that national PSE levels increase to the EU-level of 50%. 
(2) since future budget shares are not easy to estimate
4, we calculate instead the 
maximal national cost share of the non-agrarian population that would imply that 
agricultural EU-policy would be a national political economy equilibrium.  Note that 
national cost shares include both national share in EU-budget expenditures and 
national deadweight costs. Formally, this maximal cost share can be calculated as 
follows: 
                                                 
3 In fact a third change occurs, that is the policy mix would also change. For simplicity we neglect this change in 
our simulation analyses. This can at least partly be justified, since most accession countries have already adapted 
















Maximal national cost shares calculated according to eq.(15) are presented in table 
3. To be able to analyze to what extent calculated cost shares imply problems of 
political feasibility, table 3 additionally contains the share of national cost to finance 
total national direct payments calculated by Weise et. al. (2001) assuming that the 
current EU-system will be continued in an enlarged EU.  
As can be seen from table 3 assuming national financing of EU-policy EU-accession of 
would be hardly politically feasible in any CEEC-countries. An exception might be 
seen in Slovenia for which the calculated maximal national cost share is at least 
relatively close to 1. Thus, neglecting for the moment possible welfare gains in the 
manufacturing sector, political feasibility of EU-accession crucially depends on 
keeping the principle of financial solidarity. Now, assuming financial solidarity political 
feasibility seem to be no problem in most CEEC-countries giving the calculated 
maximal national cost shares in table 3. For all CEEC-countries these shares lie high 
above the corresponding cost shares calculated by Weise et. al. The only exception is 
again Slovenia, where the cost share imposed by financing direct payment lies 
already above the maximal cost share guaranteeing political feasibility.  
Interpreting these results one has to keep in mind that simulation analyses 
correspond only to partial political economy analyses, since welfare gains or losses in 
the manufacturing sector implied by EU-accession have been neglected. Of course, 
assuming positive welfare gains implied by EU accession in the manufacturing sector, 
overall political feasibility can still be reached. However, actual discussion at both 
academic and political level assume that CEEC mainly gain from EU-accession via 
realized net welfare gains in the agricultural sector. Therefore, given this assumption 
our simulation results highlight an important trade-off between political feasibility of 
EU-accession and economic efficiency of CAP. Empirically, this trade-off has to be 
solved in international negotiations among actual EU-member states and CEEC-
candidates. Monitoring on-going negotiations indicates that EU-15 seems to be 
                                                                                                                                                         
4 Note that national budget shares in the model reflects both (a) the national share in financing EU-budget and 
(b) the total amount of future EU-budget.   24
willing to trade-off comprehensive reform of the CAP against a soon realization of 
EU-enlargement.  
In contrast, assuming a comprehensive pre-accession CAP-reform will take place, our 
regression analyses imply that possible options to achieve political feasibility in the 
CEEC under these conditions would be undertaking constitutional reforms. In 
particular, the implementation of electorate system corresponding closer to a 
proportional representation or the establishment of bicameralism would be, at least 
theoretically, possible options. 
 
4  Conclusion 
The paper shows, that beyond economic and demographic structures political 
institutions do have a crucial impact on the political power of the agrarian population 
in the ten Central and Eastern European Candidates States. Political variables which 
were tested in the econometric analyses correspond to the organization of 
legislature, the electorate system and the cost of organization of agrarian interest 
groups. The analyses in this paper point out, that the electorate system has the 
highest impact on the political bargaining power of the agrarian population. 
Regarding the legislative organization, it was exposed that bicameralism implies c.p. 
a higher weight of the agrarian population. In detail, moving from unicameralism to 
bicameralism induce an increase of average political bargaining power of 50%.  
In contrast to former political economy studies (e.g. Gardner 1987) no significant 
influence on political power was found neither for the share of rural population nor 
the share of the agriculture in total GDP. 
Applying our simple political economy model to analyze EU-accession indicates a 
trade-off between domestic political feasibility of EU-accession within CEC-states and 
overall economic efficiency of future CAP. In particular, political feasibility of EU-
accession crucially depends on keeping the principle of financial solidarity, while 
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Table1:  Empirical economic data and variable values used in regression analysis 
   Latvia  Lithuania  Estonia  Bulgaria  Romania  Slovakia 
Czech 
Republic  Poland  Hungary  Slovenia 
PSE-Measure (%)  8  18  9  5  9  25  11  22  16  42 
Relative Political-
Weight of Agrarian 
Population  0,155  0,156  0,183  0,188  0,348  0,639  0,663  0,690  0,748  0,887 
Relative Income 
Redistribution  0,2  0,2  0,2  1,0  0,6  1,0  1,8  1,2  2,1  2,6 
GDP per capita (Ecu)  1568  1324  2274  881  1239  2759  3980  2782  3466  7523 
 
economical + structural variables 
GDP-Share (%)  5  10  3,6  15  13,9  4,5  3,7  3,8  5  4 
Rural Population-
Share (%)  26  26  25  32  43  40  34  36  34  48 
                     
political variables 
Organization of legislature 
Bicameralism  0  0  0  0  1  0  1  1  0  1 
Presidency  0  1  0  1  1  1  1  1  0  1 
Electoral System 
Electorate System 
Index  0,7  0,55  0,5  0,5  0,5  0,8  0,8  0,5  0,85  0,9 
Magnitude (number of 
candidates)  40  1  6  8  8  37,5  25  10  4,1  11 
Electorate Treshhold 
(%)  5  0  2  4  3  5  5  5  4  0 
Cost of organization 
Peasent Party  0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  1  1   29
Table 2:  Main results of regression analysis 
 
Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 
Adjusted R-squared 
0.49  0.01  0.65  0.72  0.68  0.76  0.75 
Variable  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient  Coefficient 
-0.759 -0.367 -0.532 -0.532 -0.702 -0.178 -0.410 CONST 
*(-1.601) (-0.613) (-1.647) (-1.841) (-2.486) (-0.62) (-2.097)
0.152 0.136 0.189 0.190   0.237 0.245
Bicameralism (O1) 
(0.794) (0.51) (1.228) (1.399)   (2.559) (2.62)
0.033 -0.116 0.004        
Presidency (O2) 
(0.169) (-0.468) (0.028)        
1.207   0.975 0.970 0.832 0.860 1.069 Electorate System Index
(E1)  (1.958)   (2.322) (2.795) (2.321) (2.504) (3.691)
-0.007 0.004          
Magnitude (E2) 
(-0.716) (0.333)          
0.043 0.005           Electorate Threshold  
(E3)  (0.838) (0.07)          
0.008 0.021 0.006 0.006 0.016     Rural Population  
Share (I1)  (0.494) (1.012) (0.466) (0.603) (1.98)    
0.073 0.192 0.162 0.162 0.148 0.194 0.181
Peasant Party (I2) 
(0.388) (0.768) (1.379) (1.551) (1.326) (2.073) (1.916)
          -0.014  
GDP-Share 
          (-1.095)  
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Table 3:  Corresponding and maximal national cost shares 
 
   Latvia  Lithuania  Estonia  Bulgaria  Romania  Slovakia 
Czech 
Republic  Poland  Hungary  Slovenia 
Corresponding* 
national cost shares  0,13 0,10 0,24 0,09 0,05 0,23 0,29 0,23 0,19 0,98
maximal national 
cost shares  0,49 0,69 0,66 0,36 0,32 0,64 0,32 0,55 0,44 0,89
*by Weise et al. (2001) 
 
 